Consumer welfare in EU competition law: what is it (not) about? by Daskalova, Victoria
  ISSN 1745-638X (Online) 
THE COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 
Volume 11 Issue 1 pp 133-162 July 2015 
Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law: What Is It (Not) About? 
Victoria Daskalova* 
 
More than a decade after the proclamation of consumer welfare as a goal of EU competition 
law, a fundamental question remains unanswered: namely, what is the content of the EU 
consumer welfare standard? What types of benefits and harms count respectively as welfare and 
as harm? Whose harm and whose benefit is included in the definition? Few answers have been 
available to these crucial, from a legal perspective, questions. The goal of this article is to 
explore the meaning of consumer welfare in terms of these questions. In particular, considering 
the assumption that the notion of consumer welfare in EU competition law is borrowed from 
economics, the article will attempt to verify to what extent consumer welfare coincides with the 
notion of consumer surplus in economics. The focus is therefore on 1) whether consumer can 
be taken to mean the final consumer or the intermediary purchaser and 2) whether the notion 
of harm refers primarily to price effects. Part I of the paper focuses on the definition of 
consumer welfare in antitrust law and in economics. Part II considers the definitions of 
consumer welfare in the Commission’s soft law and argues that a finding of an end user surplus 
cannot be supported. Part III turns to the jurisprudence of the European Courts and argues 
that support for end-user surplus cannot be found in the Court’s case law. The paper concludes 
that although we do not find support for an end-user surplus standard in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, the change in language in the 2012 Post Danmark ruling leaves us wondering as to 
whether and in what direction the Court’s approach might change. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is perhaps shocking to think that the meaning of “consumer welfare” – purportedly 
the ultimate goal of EU competition policy at least for the past 10 years – remains 
unclear. It is furthermore ironic given that one of the reasons consumer welfare was 
introduced was to bring clarity and uniformity in light of the upcoming decentralization 
of enforcement and big enlargement in 2004.1 A standard based on economic science, 
the reasoning goes, would be objective and specific enough to keep competition law 
enforcement consistent throughout the EU, thus minimizing divergence and guarding 
against protectionism. Unfortunately, more than fifteen years after its introduction in 
                                                                                                                                         
*  The author is a junior member of the Tilburg Law and Economics Center in Tilburg University, the 
Netherlands and can be reached at victoria.daskalova@gmail.com. The author would like to thank Wolf 
Sauter, Pierre Larouche, Gijsbert Zwart, Eric van Damme, Natalia Fiedziuk and Agnieszka Janzuk-
Gorywoda for the helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Any mistakes or omissions are the 
sole responsibility of the author. 
1  David Gerber, 'Two Forms of Modernization in European Competition Law' (2008) 31(5) Fordham 
International Law Journal 1235, 1253-1254. 
Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law 
  (2015) 11(1) CompLRev 134 
the vocabulary of DG Competition,2 consumer welfare remains a vague term which 
generates more questions than it answers.  
What consumer welfare means is far from self-evident. Who qualifies as a consumer? 
What counts as welfare? As the references for preliminary ruling in Syfait,3 Sot Lelos Kai4 
and T-Mobile5 showed, national courts and national authorities6 struggle with such 
questions. This is understandable given the fact that consumer welfare is not properly 
defined in any binding legal instrument.7  
There are other good reasons why the concept is unclear and these have to do with the 
origins of the concept and the history of its use in antitrust literature. Firstly, consumer 
welfare is a term borrowed from economics. According to anecdotal evidence, many 
economists, but also some lawyers, believe that the term “consumer welfare” as used by 
the European Commission or by competition lawyers has the same meaning as the 
term “consumer welfare” used in economics textbooks. The second reason for 
confusion is very much connected to the first. Consumer welfare was first introduced 
in US antitrust law and was subsequently adopted in other jurisdictions, thus 
strengthening the perception that consumer welfare is a solid concept the meaning of 
which is anchored in economics. However, as this article aims to show, looking to the 
US experience with consumer welfare for clarity as to how the term is to be interpreted 
in law, is not much of use either. 
In the EU, there are more specific reasons for confusion. Firstly, if one is to look to the 
definitions of consumer welfare offered by the Commission in its soft law instruments, 
speeches and papers, these vary in terms of content from one document to another, 
and they have also changed over time. Secondly, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union,8 which has generally dismissed the importance of consumer welfare and has 
                                                                                                                                         
2  The author traces the first Commission reference to the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints. See 
Commission (EU) ‘Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy’ (Green Paper on Vertical 
Restraints) COM (96) 721 final, 22 January 1997, 17. 
3  Case C-53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and Others v GlaxoSmithKline plc and 
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE [2005] I-04609, [20]. 
4  Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot Lelos Kai and others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon Proïonton 
[2008] I-07139, [23]. 
5  Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad 
van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] I-04529, [19]. 
6  The reference in Syfait (n 3) came from the Greek competition authority which was unsure about the 
importance of harm to final consumers and referred this question to the CJEU. The reference for 
preliminary ruling is indicative of the implications of a lack of a clear standard for the work of national 
courts and authorities. The reference in this case was dismissed but on other grounds – namely, lack of 
jurisdiction of the Court.   
7  It should be noted that references to consumer welfare were introduced exclusively in soft law, not hard 
law. This creates further complications since the binding nature of the Commission’s soft law in the field of 
competition law is sometimes put into question. Consider in this respect Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. v 
Autorité de la concurrence and Others [2012] Electronic Reports of Cases (Court Reports - general), [30] in which 
the Court held that publication in the C serious of the Official Journal is an indication of the non-binding 
nature of a Commission notice. 
8  It should be noted that previously, the Court of First Instance signaled a willingness to accept the consumer 
welfare standard. See Joined Cases T-213/01 and T-214/01 Österreichische Postsparkasse AG and Bank für 
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refrained from using or defining the term, has arguably recently had a change of heart. 
In its judgment in Post Danmark, the CJEU for the first time mentioned, but did not 
define, the term “consumer welfare”9 and made a reference to “price, choice, quality, or 
innovation”,10 which is the formulation usually used by the Commission to refer to 
consumer welfare. This was interpreted as showing willingness on the part of the Court 
to finally recognize consumer welfare after judgments which had put the validity of 
consumer welfare as a goal for EU competition law into question. In fact, a closer look 
to the Court’s language in this ruling calls for a more modest interpretation of the 
Court’s opinion of consumer welfare. This article argues that it is too early to draw 
conclusions about the actual significance of this change of language and suggests that, if 
anything, the change in language adds to the existing confusion instead of alleviating it. 
The goal of this article is to contribute to the effort of clarifying the meaning of 
consumer welfare in EU competition law. It discusses in depth the sources of 
confusion mentioned above and argues that there is a need for an unequivocal 
definition of consumer welfare. When discussing the notion of consumer welfare as 
used in the EU, it focuses on two aspects of the consumer welfare question, deemed to 
be especially unclear:  1) whether “consumer” can be taken to mean final consumer 
only or the intermediary purchaser and 2) whether the notion of harm primarily refers 
to price effects. Part 1 focuses on the definition of consumer welfare in economics and 
in US law. Sub-section 1 considers the economics definition of consumer welfare and 
tries to derive answers to the question what the meaning of welfare is and whose 
welfare is to be protected. Sub-section 2 gives a brief account of the introduction of 
consumer welfare in US antitrust law and why the interpretation of the term is unclear. 
Parts 2 and 3 bring the focus to the EU. Part 2 examines the definitions of consumer 
welfare used in the Commission’s soft law and argues that a finding of an end user 
surplus standard cannot be supported. Part 3 focuses on the practice of the European 
Courts and addresses the question to what extent an end-user surplus standard is 
endorsed in the jurisprudence of the European Courts. Part 4 concludes with the 
finding that although we still do not know exactly what consumer welfare in EU 
competition law is about, we can certainly discard the end-user surplus standard as a 
possible answer. 
                                                                                                                                         
Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR II-01601 and Case T-168/01 
GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR II-02969, [134], [147]. 
However, the CJEU disagreed with the ruling in the latter case and dismissed the need to prove consumer 
harm. See Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services 
Unlimited v Commission of the European Communities [2009] I-09291. 
9  Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] (electronic Reports of Cases).  
10  See Post Danmark (ibid), [22]. The exact words of the Courts are “Thus, not every exclusionary effect is 
necessarily detrimental to competition. Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure 
from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to 
consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation.” (references 
omitted).  
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PART 1:  CONSUMER WELFARE IN LAW AND IN ECONOMICS 
1.1. Consumer welfare in economics 
Consumer welfare is mostly known as a term from economics, so a lawyer seeking to 
find the definition consumer welfare is likely to look up the definition of the term in 
economics. Such a definition will probably be similar to the OECD glossary “standard 
economic” definition of consumer welfare, which explains the utilitarian logic of the 
concept and how it is measured in practice: 
“Consumer welfare refers to the individual benefits derived from the consumption 
of goods and services. In theory, individual welfare is defined by an individual’s 
own assessment of his/her satisfaction, given prices and income. Exact measurement 
of consumer welfare therefore requires information about individual preferences. […] In practice, 
applied welfare economics uses the notion of consumer surplus to measure consumer welfare. When 
measured over all consumers, consumers’ surplus is a measure of aggregate consumer welfare. In 
anti-trust applications, some argue that the goal is to maximize consumers’ surplus, 
while others argue that producer benefits should also be counted.”11  
What we notice is that the notion of consumer welfare is in practice linked to another 
term of art in economics – namely, “consumer surplus”. The OECD glossary also gives 
a definition of the term ‘consumer surplus’: 
“Consumers’ surplus is a measure of consumer welfare and is defined as the excess 
of social valuation of product over the price actually paid. It is measured by the 
area of a triangle below a demand curve and above the observed price.”12  
Welfare is highly subjective because the welfare is linked to the individual’s utility from 
the consumption of a particular good (an ice cream) or service (a haircut). We might 
never know the exact magnitude of utility that consumption of these services brings for 
the particular individual and we would certainly struggle to compare them across 
individuals. In practice, these difficulties are surmounted by considering how much 
different individuals would be willing to pay for the particular good or service.  
What the lawyer might conclude from this brief research is that consumer welfare is a 
broad concept accommodating a variety of potentially incommensurable individual 
preferences, but that in practice it is measured by estimating consumer surplus. 
Furthermore, the lawyer will be quick to notice that in welfare analysis, the “public 
good” or the utility of society do not exist separately from the aggregate welfare of the 
individuals making it up. The public utility or public welfare is measured by summing 
up the individual utilities of the members of society. In the context of antitrust analysis 
which is linked to relevant product and geographic markets, this would mean summing 
                                                                                                                                         
11  R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro (eds), OECD Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and 
Competition Law (1993) as seen in OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms 
<https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3177> accessed 7 July 2015 (italics added). 
12  R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro (eds), OECD Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and 
Competition Law (1993) as seen in OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms < 
https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3176 > accessed 7 July 2015. 
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up the preferences of individual consumers on that particular market, which might well 
be different from the preferences of society broadly defined.13   
1.1.1. Surplus v welfare 
Consumer surplus as defined above refers to the benefit accruing to the consumers of a 
product when the price they pay is lower than the maximum amount that they would 
be willing to spend to purchase the product or service in question.14 Most of the time a 
welfare analysis is static in the sense that it only considers the current conditions and 
the current welfare and not the implications for future welfare.15 According to this 
definition, the lawyer would probably consider that “harm” under this standard would 
mean a reduction in the “wealth” of the consumer because of an increase in prices. 
Accordingly, consumer “benefit” under this standard would mean an increase in the 
“wealth” of the consumer by means of a price reduction. Thus, while in theory we 
aspire to maximizing welfare, in practice, we use price effects as a proxy. In practice, 
welfare is reduced to a price advantage. 
It is worth wondering what is lost when this compromise is made. A lawyer might 
nonetheless keep in mind that the notion of welfare is broader than the notion of 
surplus, which means that welfare encompasses more than effects on price16 or 
output.17 What is not clear is how the broader elements of welfare can be brought into 
antitrust analysis or argument. For instance, the lawyer’s client might claim that price 
increases will be compensated by improvements in quality or in innovation and claim 
that these improvements matter to consumers’ utility at least as much as price. What is 
less clear is how we can include these components into the analysis when they are not 
captured by a consumer surplus test. 
The economics profession has realized these difficulties, but the search for a solution in 
this respect it is still ongoing. Some economists have cautioned that consumer surplus 
in and of itself should not be used as a sole consideration as it might lead to unintended 
effects – namely, to a sacrifice of dynamic efficiency, and that in practice, this standard 
                                                                                                                                         
13  See for instance the discussion in Barak Orbach, 'The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox' (2010) 7(1) 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 133. Orbach reiterates the well-known observation that under a 
welfare analysis the individuals’ preferences might include activities which are judged contrary to the public 
interest (e.g. tobacco and alcohol use). Such activities might be detrimental to the larger public for instance 
due to increases in crime and higher public health expenditures. Furthermore, they might also be detrimental 
to the individual in the long-run. Thus, if we include a time dimension, we might also conclude that the 
short-term utility from the consumption of such goods might be contrary to the long-term preferences of 
these very same consumers. However, static welfare analysis only considers present-day effects. 
14  The definition and graphical representation of consumer surplus are widely available in economic textbooks. 
This author has referred to Edgar Browning and Mark Zupan, Microeconomics: theory & applications (John Wiley 
&Sons, 2009), 101-105; Massimo Motta, Competition policy: theory and practice (1st edn, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2004), 18. 
15  Motta notes that a welfare analysis should not necessarily be taken to mean a static analysis, but cautions 
that “the two things do not necessarily coincide”, namely an authority will have to make a choice in terms of 
the type of analysis to use. See Motta (n 14), 19. 
16  We should note that price effects and output effects are very much linked. For instance, higher prices can 
result from an output restriction and vice versa.  
17  Phil Evans, ‘Assessing consumer detriment’ (2007) 28(1) E.C.L.R., 26. 
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has to be used cautiously or in such a way as to ensure that reliance on the consumer 
surplus measure does not lead to undesirable results – for instance, to a stifling of 
innovation and future efficiencies.18  
The difficulty with correcting for this shortcoming of consumer surplus as a tool to 
measure welfare is the fact that economics does not offer reliable ways of measuring 
dynamic efficiency.19 Yet, dynamic efficiency has been recognized as one of the most 
important factors in economic growth and human progress.20 In this case, the quote 
attributed to Einstein applies with full force: “Not everything that counts can be 
counted, and not everything that can be counted counts”.  
Finally, the economic notion of “consumer welfare” does not tell us how to balance 
gains in consumer surplus (which can be measured) with possible future gains in 
consumer welfare flowing from expected improvements in products or choice. Thus, 
while consumer welfare tells us what type of harm and what type of benefit are 
preferred, the question as to how the different types of gains and harms can be 
measured and compared in a reliable way remains without answer.  
1.1.2. Consumer v customer 
A competition lawyer would also want to know whose harm or benefit would count in 
an antitrust or merger case. In this case, the precise meaning of the term consumer is 
crucial. Disappointingly, the meaning of “consumer” in consumer welfare has proved 
to be a major source of confusion for lawyers and courts21 as well as for academics.22 
                                                                                                                                         
18  Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application and Measurement (3rd 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), 31-32. The authors caution: “[I]f regulators treat the pursuit of consumer 
welfare in an entirely static framework, then this can lead to significantly sub-optimal outcomes. (In 
particular, problems can arise when the pursuit of consumer welfare leads to an attitude or belief that any 
profits earned by firms must be at the cost of consumer welfare.) Such an attitude might be reasonable in a 
static framework such as that outlined above, but s not reasonable in a dynamic framework in which firms 
invest and innovate to the ultimate benefit of consumers.” See also Dennis Carlton, ‘Does Antitrust Need to 
be Modernized?’ (2007) 21(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 155, 157. Carlton notes that “the most significant 
practical problem with a consumer surplus standard is that, as commonly applied, it tends to favor short-run 
price reductions over long-run efficiency gains.” 
19  OECD, ‘Dynamic Efficiencies in Merger Analysis’ (Roundtable) (2007) < 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/40623561.pdf > accessed 7 July 2015. The summary on the 
cover calls dynamic efficiencies “devilishly difficult to identify and measure.” This point is reiterated in the 
Executive Summary at 9-11. 
20  See OECD, 'Innovation and Growth: Rationale for an Innovation Strategy' (2007) 
<http://www.oecd.org/science/inno/39374789.pdf > accessed 7 July 2015; Robert Cooter and Hans-
Bernd Schaefer, “Solomon's Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Nations” (Princeton University Press, 
2011) available at: <http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/156 > accessed 7 July 2015. Cooter and 
Schaefer explain how poor countries’ failure to grow is linked to insufficient innovation in their economies 
(6). The authors also point out that traditional law and economic theory has neglected the issue of 
innovation and growth (2). 
21  In T-Mobile (n 5), both the Dutch Court submitting the reference for a preliminary ruling and the defendents 
in the case on national level made the argument that their agreement to fix the remuneration of dealers was 
not to be considered anticompetitive because it had no impact on final consumers. See Case C-8/08 T-
Mobile Netherlands BV and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-04529, 
Opinion of AG Kokott, [55].  The Court found the arguments unconvincing. See T-Mobile (n 5), [36]. 
Similarly, the General Court in GlaxoSmithKline (n 8) considered consumer welfare to mean final consumer 
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For the sake of greater clarity, it has been suggested that the term “end-user welfare” be 
used for when the goal of antitrust is the welfare of the final consumer,23 as opposed to 
just another company down the supply chain. The economic definition does not offer 
the answer, although sometimes in the literature, the consumers are assumed to be the 
final consumers – the “natural persons” walking into a store or going to a website to 
purchase a good.24 In order to know whose welfare is at stake we need to consider the 
specific factual situation and economic model at hand. The model might just as well 
specify that it involves bargaining between two companies with market power or that it 
involves a monopolist selling to a perfectly competitive market of companies, not 
individuals.  
The distinction between the intermediate purchaser (a firm part of the supply chain) 
and the consumer, who is buying the product for consumption and not for production, 
is crucial for those antitrust cases where harm is not suffered directly by final 
consumers, but for instance for business partners (e.g. producers, agents) or by 
competitors. For instance, one of the conventional arguments in the debate on buyer 
power is that when powerful buyers extract surplus from their business partners, we 
can expect final consumers to benefit: we assume that powerful buyers will act as a 
check on powerful (or inefficient sellers), push them to lower prices and then pass this 
benefit down on to the consumer in the form of low prices.25 If consumer welfare 
simply means purchaser welfare, there is indeed an increase in consumer welfare – 
because the company-buyer has increases its surplus. However, under a welfare 
standard concerned with final consumers only, the outcome is uncertain. We cannot 
immediately conclude if the practice harms final consumers because we do not know if 
this surplus ever makes it to the final consumer. In order to know this we need to 
                                                                                                                                         
prices. The ruling was overturned by the Court of Justice on appeal. See Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 
P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European Communities 
[2009] I-09291. 
22  The difference between final and intermediary consumer has been discussed at length in the US antitrust 
scholarship (see below). In the EU, Pinar Akman has drawn attention to the fact that the differences 
between an antitrust standard protecting final consumers and an antitrust standard protecting customers or 
“intermediate purchasers” are not trivial. See Pinar Akman, 'Consumer' versus 'Customer' : The Devil in the 
Detail' (2010) 37 (2) Journal of Law and Society, 315. 
23  Gregory Werden coined the term to distinguish between aggregate welfare and consumer welfare. See 
Gregory Werden, 'Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light' (2007) 74 Antitrust 
Law Journal 707 See also John Shively, 'When Does Buyer Power Become Monopsony Pricing' [2012, Fall] 
Antitrust Magazine, 87. Shively writes: “During the period anticipating the Supreme Court's pronouncement 
on these issues, another school of thought emerged, arguing that “consumer welfare” should mean “end-
user welfare” – the welfare of the sub-set of consumers who are the ultimate purchasers of X+Y Company's 
product (and not all consumers generally impacted by allocative inefficiency, as Bork argued).” Shively, 88. 
24  See for instance Motta (n 14), 20-22. The assumption throughout the discussion on total welfare versus 
consumer welfare is that the consumers are citizens, not companies. The OECD glossary definitions cited 
above (n 11, n 12) also suggest that the consumer is an individual.  
25  The argument goes back to John Galbraith’s theory of countervailing power. See John Galbraith, American 
Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Penguin Books, in association with Hamish Hamilton, 
Harmondsworth, 1963). In the EU, the argument has been made in, among others, Julian Maitland-Walker, 
'Buyer power' (2000) 21(3) European Competition Law Review (Quarterly), 170; Alan Overd, 'Buyer Power' 
(2001) 22 (6) European Competition Law Review (Quarterly), 249; A Pera and V Bonfitto 'Buyer Power in 
Anti-trust Investigations: A Review' (2011) 32 European Competition Law Review (Quarterly), 414. 
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conduct a separate analysis in which we examine the competitive conditions under 
which the firm sells to the consumer.26 In fact, the existence of buyer power is one of 
the powerful arguments for not applying a consumer welfare standard.27 
The requirement of proof of end-user harm has implications for enforcement. Many 
antitrust cases would probably never materialize if we accept a focus on final 
consumers only since only a percentage of all companies active in the economy sell 
directly to final consumers.28 Realistically, the companies that do that are retailers 
(brick-and-mortar or online), utility companies, phone companies, banks and some 
other service providers and most of these, with the notable exception of retailers, tend 
to already be subject to specific regulation with the purpose of safeguarding consumer 
interest. However, behind every product that reaches the consumer, there is a whole 
web of inter-relationships that involve companies only. An antitrust focus on end-user 
welfare would mean that most of the abuses occurring along a supply chain would be 
insulated from antitrust inquiry, unless a concrete impact on final consumers can be 
shown.  
A major difficulty when there is uncertainty about who the customer is relates to 
measurement. If an antitrust standard is only concerned with end-user welfare, does that 
mean that enforcers should prove that the harm traveled all the way down to the final 
consumer? The experiences with the calculation of antitrust damages have taught us 
that estimating the damage to the final consumers can be a complex and expensive 
exercise.29 Quantification of the damages from a cartel far up the supply chain needs to 
overcome serious estimation problems, even when it is conducted ex post and a lot of 
information is available. The question is if we should expect antitrust authorities to 
spend resources on such complicated analysis every time they assess anticompetitive 
conduct or a merger. 
1.1.3. The choice of standard matters 
We see from the above that the economic definition of consumer welfare only tells us 
that the consumer is the purchaser of a good or a service and does not make a 
distinction between individuals and companies. It also does not explain how to assess 
tradeoffs between consumers on different relevant product or geographic markets. The 
consumer welfare standard simply holds that we should maximize welfare. However, it 
is not clear how we should trade-off welfare increases for urban consumers achieved at 
                                                                                                                                         
26  Shively (n 23), 88. 
27  Dennis Carlton, ‘Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?’ (2007) 21(3) Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
155. Carlton puts it rather convincingly: “I know of no proponent of the consumer surplus standard who 
endorses buyer cartels, or who believes that monopsony is not harmful. Instead, proponents of a consumer 
surplus rule tend to argue that buyer cartels and monopsony are exceptions to the otherwise sensible rule of 
maximizing consumer surplus. However, the need for these exceptions illustrates the lack of a coherent 
logic for the consumer surplus standard.” See Carlton at 158. 
28  A similar point is made by Carlton, who notes that “most transactions in the U.S. economy are between 
firms” and that virtually all companies are active in the economy both as sellers and as buyers. Ibid., 158. 
29  Commission (EU), ‘White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules’ COM (2008) 165 
final, 7-8. 
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the expense of rural consumers or how to trade off the gains to consumers of a higher 
quality product against the losses to consumers of a lower quality product. However, in 
practice, it does matter to specify whose welfare counts most in antitrust disputes.  
Not making a choice between intermediary and final consumers can lead to serious 
conceptual inconsistency and confusion among market operators and competition law 
enforcers as to the correct standard to be applied. When intermediary purchasers are 
protected under a consumer welfare standard, it becomes difficult to justify the fact that 
the interest of the same company should be valued more when it is acting as a 
purchaser than when it is acting as a seller. The discrepancy is apparent if we consider 
the case of SMEs “squeezed” between powerful suppliers and powerful customers. 
When buying their inputs, they would be overcharged by powerful sellers; when selling 
their own wares, their profits would be undermined by the demands of powerful 
buyers.  
Under a consumer welfare standard which does not distinguish between intermediary 
and final consumers, the SME would be treated differently purely on the basis of its 
position in the supply chain. In its capacity as a consumer, the company would be 
protected under the antitrust laws. In its capacity as a seller, however, it would not be. 
Yet, if we protect only the ability of companies to buy cheaply and do not guard against 
exploitation they face from their own buyers, we risk putting in question the antitrust 
enforcement against powerful suppliers. Furthermore, the distinction between buying 
and selling is sometimes simply a matter of language and interpretation rather than 
some objective reality. Barak Orbach claims that in many transactions, the roles of 
buyers and sellers are subject to interpretation, such as in the case of insurance where 
consumers can be seen as buyers of insurance services or as sellers of risk.30  We can 
see this in other industries as well. For instance, retailers are traditionally seen as buyers 
of goods and services, but they also act as suppliers of shelf space and more generally, 
distribution services. In the case of online search markets, we might also wonder if the 
consumers should be seen as “sellers” of data or as consumers of online search 
services. 
This distinction is relevant for the decades-long debate as to whether total welfare (the 
combination of producer and consumer surplus) should be preferred over consumer 
surplus. The preference for consumer surplus seems to hinge on the assumption that 
the buyers in the supply-and-demand graph are final consumers, namely ordinary 
citizens and not corporations. However, when the notion of “consumer” encompasses 
both individuals and companies, the usefulness of the debate is blurred. The conflict 
between producer and consumer welfare will therefore be artificial because the conflict 
will be between the welfare of one company and the welfare of another company. 
The present inquiry into the economic definition of consumer welfare, has failed to 
produce exhaustive answers as to what kind of injury and to whom a consumer welfare 
standard would seek to prevent. At the same time, the discussion above has highlighted 
the pitfalls and misunderstanding that a casual interpretation of the term can lead to. 
                                                                                                                                         
30  See e.g. Orbach (n 13), 139. 
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This does not mean the economic definition is nonsensical. It simply forces us to 
realize that the definition used for the purposes of science does not necessarily answer 
the questions important for law enforcement. 
1.2. Consumer welfare and antitrust law 
Looking to the legal literature from the US to find out more about the content of EU 
consumer welfare can also prove to be a confusing experience. EU and US antitrust 
lawyers are increasingly part of the same community31 and consumer welfare is part of 
their shared vocabulary. EU scholars draw on debates in the US literature and US 
authors often join the debates in EU competition law. Relying on the US literature is 
difficult for at least two reasons. Firstly, the debate on the other side of the Atlantic is 
focused mostly on the distinction between a total welfare standard and a consumer 
welfare standard so it might not incorporate other considerations which are of greater 
importance in the EU debates on the goals of competition law.32 The second reason to 
approach the US literature with care is that the notion of consumer welfare, as 
originally introduced by Bork, was based on a flawed understanding of terms, which, as 
will be explained herein, continues to live on in the antitrust scholarship. 
Consumer welfare was effectively introduced in antitrust law by law and economics 
scholar Robert Bork in the late 1960s.33 The difficulty with Bork’s definition is that it 
misrepresented consumer welfare to mean maximization of total welfare in the sense of 
maximizing allocative efficiency. When writing about consumer welfare, Bork 
considered as equal the gains to companies and the gains for consumers.34 Although 
                                                                                                                                         
31  David Gerber explains how the emergence of the “transnational competition law group” had an influence 
on the receptiveness of the EU Commission to arguments about a more economic approach coming from 
the US. Gerber (n 1), 1248-1249. 
32  Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol, 'Welfare Standards in U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Enforcement' (2012-2013) 81 
Fordham L Rev 2497, 2509-2513. According to Blair and Sokol at 2510: “Unlike in the United States, the 
divide in Europe has not been between total welfare and consumer welfare. Instead, the divide is between 
different visions of competition – one based exclusively upon industrial organization economics versus a 
mix of industrial organization economics and noneconomic political goals.” 
33  According to research by Orbach, the use of the term “consumer welfare” in general was rather modest 
until the term gained popularity in the 1970s with the rise of the literature on “social regulation”. However, 
it was thanks to Bork that it was introduced in the antitrust literature. For an in-depth discussion, see Barak 
Orbach, 'How Antitrust Lost Its Goal' (2012-2013) 81 Fordham L Rev 2253, 2272-2275. See also Orbach (n 
13). To summarize Orbach’s findings: in a 1966 publication ('Legislative Intent and the Policy of the 
Sherman Act' (1966) 9 Journal of Law & Economics), Robert Bork argued that the legislative intent of 
Congress in creating the Sherman Act was the promotion of consumer welfare. In the 1977 case Boddicker v. 
Arizona State Dental Ass'n, the Ninth Circuit court cited Bork in support of a finding that the goal of the 
Sherman Act is “serving the public”. This footnote was noticed by the Supreme Court and was cited in its 
ruling in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). In this case, the first case to recognize consumer 
welfare as the goal of the competition laws, the Court cited to Bork’s 1978 book The Antitrust Paradox: A 
Policy at War with Itself to prove that the goal of Congress in enacting the Sherman Act was to promote 
consumer welfare.  
34  Many have pointed this out, but perhaps the best example comes from Bork himself. For Bork, both 
monopolists (companies) and natural persons are to be counted consumers. Consider the following 
statement by Bork: “Those who continue to buy after a monopoly is formed pay more for the same output, 
and that shifts income from them to the monopoly and its owners, who are also consumers. This is not dead-weight loss 
due to restriction of output but merely a shift in income between two classes of consumers. The consumer welfare model, 
which views consumers as a collectivity, does not take this income effect into account.” (emphasis added) 
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claiming that he relied on economic theory, Bork confused the terms and we know that 
he specifically did not mean consumer surplus when talking about consumer welfare.35 
This “misunderstanding” has been called “the Chicago trap.”36 
Bork is perhaps also guilty of the confusion about the relationship between consumer 
welfare and the concept of “efficiency”. Maximizing consumer welfare has often been 
equated with maximizing efficiency. However, this proposition can only be true if we 
clarify that consumer welfare means total welfare and that maximizing efficiency refers 
to allocative efficiency only.37 For Bork, whose analysis did not consider dynamic 
efficiency, maximizing “consumer welfare” meant maximizing allocative efficiency 
without impairing productive efficiency.38  
Economists know that efficiency is not the same thing as consumer welfare and that 
efficiency cannot be reduced to allocative efficiency.39 The fundamental meaning of 
efficiency – a term used in disciplines beyond economics and also in common language 
– is, simply put, the best use of a certain means to the achievement of a certain end – 
an optimization, we might say. Specifically in the economics discipline, three types of 
efficiencies are recognized: allocative, productive and dynamic. As was discussed above, 
consumer welfare, represented by the proxy of consumer surplus, is measured in the 
context of assessing allocative efficiency. Consumer surplus thus represents only one 
specific aspect of the much broader notion of economic efficiency. 
Unfortunately, Bork’s misunderstanding lives on in the competition law literature and it 
has led to the proliferation of a variety of terms or “proxies” used to mean consumer 
welfare. Among these “proxies” the most prominent are: efficiency, allocative 
efficiency, economic welfare, and wealth.40 The concurrent usage of these terms 
                                                                                                                                         
See Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1978), 110.  
At another point in the text, Bork defines a dead-weight loss (which in economic terms includes a loss in 
total welfare) as “the amount above costs that consumers would be willing to pay for the lost output”. See 
Ibid., p. 108.  
35  Ibid., 110. 
36  We might wonder whether this was a simple misunderstanding or a premeditated ruse. For instance, Katalin 
Cseres calls it the “Chicago trap”. See Katalin Cseres, Competition Law and Consumer Protection (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2005), 331-333. 
37  Efficiency encompasses dynamic and productive as well as allocative efficiencies. If only static efficiency is 
maximized, that does not mean that efficiency in general is maximized as there might be an impact on 
innovation or on productive efficiency cancelling out the positive benefit of the gains in static efficiency.  
38  Bork writes: “These two types of efficiency [allocative and productive] make up the overall efficiency that 
determines the level of our society’s wealth, or consumer welfare. The whole task of antitrust can be 
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly 
as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.” See Bork (n 34) 91. 
39  For a more detailed discussion of the different types of efficiencies, see Motta (n 14), 40-64. 
40  See for instance, Richard Posner, Antitrust Law (2nd edn, University of Chicago Press, 2001), ix. Posner 
writes in the Preface to the 2001 edition of his book on antitrust: “Almost everyone professionally involved 
in antitrust today […] not only agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, [but 
also agrees on the essential tents of economic theory that should be used to determine the consistency of 
specific business practices with that goal]. Agrees, that is, that economic welfare should be understood in terms of the 
economist’s concept of efficiency […]”. (emphasis added); See also Herbert Hovenkamp, ‘Distributive Justice and 
Consumer Welfare in Antitrust’ (2011) < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1873463 > 
accessed 7 July 2015, 1. 
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without precise definition is arguably confusing to economists and non-economists 
alike. 
In the US, the meaning of consumer welfare is open to speculation in great part 
because the US Supreme Court, which has mentioned consumer welfare a couple of 
times,41 has never explained their understanding of the concept.42 The lack of clear and 
consistent understanding of consumer welfare by the US Supreme Court has fuelled the 
interest of academics for the past three decades and has resulted in a great body of 
literature and a number of interpretations of the term. To this day, however, there is no 
consensus – not among academics, and not in terms of case law – as to how consumer 
welfare is to be understood in US antitrust43 and there are doubts as to the extent the 
discussion makes any sense in practice.44 
After consumer welfare was imported as a goal of EU competition law, EU scholars 
have also raised questions about the implications of the change with respect to the 
traditional European values of competition and economic freedom as well as what 
consumer welfare entails and whether the standard is total or consumer welfare.45 What 
we see is that contrary to the original expectations about clarity, the introduction of 
consumer welfare has resulted in much uncertainty as to what the EU competition law 
standard of assessment is about.  
                                                                                                                                         
41  Gregory Werden identifies only five US Supreme Court majority opinions in which consumer welfare was 
mentioned, namely Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (1979); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984), Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221, 224 
(1993); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069, 1077 (2007); and Leegin Creative 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2722, 2724 (2007). See Werden (n 23), 721. 
42  See Orbach (2012-2013), (n 33) and Orbach (n 13); Werden (n 23); J. Thomas Rosch, ‘Monopsony and the 
Meaning of “Consumer Welfare”: A Closer Look at Weyerhaueser’ (paper presented at the Milton Handler 
Annual Antitrust Review in New York, NY, USA on 7 December 2006) <https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2006/12/monopsony-and-meaning-consumer-welfare-closer-look-weyerhaeuser> accessed 7 
July 2015.  
43  Barak Orbach has been adamant in drawing attention to this fact. See Barak Orbach, 'Foreword: Antitrust’s 
Pursuit of Purpose' (2012-2013) 81 Fordham L Rev, 215; Orbach (n 13); Orbach (n 33); Eleanor Fox, 
'Against Goals' (2012-2013) 81 Fordham L Rev, 2157; Alan Meese, 'Reframing the (False) Choice between 
Purchaser Welfare and Total Welfare' (2012-2013) 81 Fordham L Rev, 2197. See also Blair and Sokol (n 32), 
especially at 2056-2509. 
44  Fox (n 43); David Hyman and William Kovacic, 'Institutional Design, Agency Life Cycle, and the Goals of 
Competition Law' (2012-2013) 81 Fordham L Rev, 2163. 
45  Evans (n 17); Christopher Townley, 'Which Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU? Public Policy and Its 
Discontents: the OFT’s Roundtable Discussion on Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union' (2011) 32(9) European Competition Law Review; Oles Andriychuk, 'Rediscovering the 
Spirit of Competition: On the Normative Value of the Competitive Process' (2010) 6(3) European 
Competition Journal; P Akman, 'Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC' (2009) 29(2) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 267; P Akman, '‘Consumer Welfare’ and Article 82EC: Practice and 
Rhetoric'(2009) 32(1) World Competition 71; Pinar Akman (n 22); Liza Gormsen, 'The Conflict Between 
Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the Modernisation of Article 82 EC' (2007) 3(2), European 
Competition Journal, 329; Christian Ahlborn and Carsten Grave, 'Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism: An 
Introduction from a Consumer Welfare Perspective' (2006) 2(2) Competition Policy International, 197.  
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PART 2: THE COMMISSION’S APPROACH TO CONSUMER WELFARE 
2.1. Defining consumer welfare  
The first references to consumer welfare in EU competition law appeared in the 1997 
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints.46 The definition given in that document implied an 
end-user surplus standard, namely a focus on the benefit to final consumers resulting 
from lower prices: 
“To further the interest of the consumer is at the heart of competition policy. 
Effective competition is the best guarantee for consumers to be able to buy good 
quality products at the lowest possible prices. Whenever in this green paper the 
introduction or protection of effective competition is mentioned, the protection of the consumer's 
interest by ensuring low prices is implied.”47  
The definition of the term, however, was enriched with the launch of the 
modernization package in 2004. In the 2004 Notice on the application of the former 
Article 81(3) EC,48 the Commission presented consumer welfare and allocative 
efficiency as the goals of Article 101 TFEU.49  The same proclamations appeared in the 
Guidelines on the application of the former Article 81 EC to technology transfer 
agreements (2004) 50  and in the Merger Guidelines (2004).51  These goals were repeated 
the 2005 Discussion Paper on the former Article 82 EC and in the Commission’s 
submission to the 2005 OECD Roundtable on competition on the merits.52 
                                                                                                                                         
46  Commission (EU), ‘Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy’ (Green Paper on Vertical 
Restraints) COM (96) 721 final, 22 January 1997, 17. 
47  Ibid., 17 (italics added). 
48  Commission (EU), Notice: Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97.  
49  Ibid., [13]. It is stated: “The objective of Article 81 is to protect competition on the market as a means of 
enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources.” Roughly the same 
statement is inserted in the Commission (EU), Notice: Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC 
Treaty to technology transfer agreements [2004] OJ C101/2, [5]: “The aim of Article 81 as a whole is to 
protect competition on the market with a view to promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of 
resources.” See para 13 of the Notice: “The objective of Article 81 is to protect competition on the market 
as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. Competition 
and market integration serve these ends since the creation and preservation of an open single market 
promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the Community for the benefit of consumers.” 
50  See Commission (EU), Notice: Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology 
transfer agreements [2004] OJ C101/2, [7]: “Indeed, both bodies of law [competition law and intellectual 
property rights law] share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare and an efficient 
allocation of resources.” Interestingly, this proposition was slightly rephrased in the 2011 Guidelines on 
cooperation agreements to convey that both intellectual property laws and competition law pursue “the 
same objectives of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.” (italics added). Arguably, this is more 
in line with the recent focus on innovation. See Commission (EU), Guidelines on the applicability of article 
101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] 
OJ C11/1 at [269]. 
51  Commission (EU), Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/03, [8]. However, there is no explicit 
mention of consumer welfare as the goal of EU merger policy in the Merger Regulation. 
52  The Commission states: “With regard to exclusionary abuses the objective of Article 82 is the protection of 
competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient 
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Such a formulation of consumer welfare corresponds to the one championed by Bork – 
namely, a total welfare standard based on allocative efficiency considerations. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that commentators interpreted this as indicative of an 
Americanization of EU competition law and of an adoption of the Chicago School 
approach to antitrust.53 The question remains as to whether such conclusions were 
justified in practice.54 What has the proclamation of consumer welfare meant for the 
Commission’s definition of harm and a victim of harm? Given the many definitions 
and their evolution over time, establishing a positive answer is a difficult task. For this 
reason, the following sections will limit themselves to verifying whether the 
Commission’s approach could be reduced to end-user surplus. 
2.2. Protecting consumers and customers alike 
In principle, the EU competition law notion of “consumer welfare” should not be 
reduced to end-user welfare.55 In EU competition law, “consumers” encompasses both 
intermediate consumers or “customers” and final consumers. Whether the consumer is 
a multinational supermarket chain or the average person going to the supermarket to 
buy a carton of milk should not matter – both are considered consumers for the 
purposes of EU competition law. The Commission has not necessarily been explicit 
about this fact, but has not hidden it very well either. The distinction is explained in the 
Commission’s 2004 Notice on the application of Article 81(3): 
“The concept of ‘consumers’ encompasses all direct or indirect users of the products 
covered by the agreement, including producers that use the products as an input, 
wholesalers, retailers and final consumers, i.e. natural persons who are acting for 
purposes which can be regarded as outside their trade or profession. In other 
                                                                                                                                         
allocation of resources.”  See Commission (EU), DG Competition, Discussion Paper on the application of Article 
82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses [2005] <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/ 
discpaper2005.pdf> accessed 7 July 2015, [4]. See also the submission by the European Commission in 
OECD, “Policy Roundtable: Competition on the Merits” (2005) 27 DAF/COMP < 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/35911017.pdf > accessed 7 July 2015, 221. The Commission 
submitted: “As in [the modernised policy regarding mergers and restrictive agreements and practices], the 
protection of competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation 
of resources should be put at the centre of competition policy regarding the application of Art. 82.” (italics 
in the original).  
53 In a widely read and cited article, Andreas Weitbrecht made a claim that a rapprochement between the EU 
competition law regime and the US antitrust regime was  taking place and that EU competition law was 
becoming Americanized. Weitbrecht does mention that the Commission adopted “its own version of the 
consumer welfare approach developed by the Chicago School”(at 85, italics added) and that “In making this 
transition, EC competition law has been heavily influenced by the development in the United States, in 
particular the Chicago School, while retaining its own characteristics and identity.”(at 81, italics added). See Andreas 
Weitbrecht, ‘From Freiburg to Chicago and Beyond – the First 50 Years of European Competition Law’ 
(2008) 29(2) European Competition Law Review, 81-88. 
54  See P Akman, '‘Consumer Welfare’ and Article 82EC: Practice and Rhetoric' (2009) 32(1) World 
Competition 71. In this article, Akman argued that the use of “consumer welfare” by the Commission seems 
to be a rhetorical device rather than a real standard applied in the Commission’s practice. 
55  Nonetheless, it has taken some time before the distinction between customer and consumer was noticed. 
Consider, for example, the questions in the preliminary ruling in T-Mobile (n 5). Many did not realize that 
consumers meant not just final consumers but intermediary ones as well. Akman has drawn attention to this 
fact in several articles. See Akman (n 22) and Akman (n 54). 
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words, consumers within the meaning of Article 81(3) are the customers of the 
parties to the agreement and subsequent purchasers. These customers can be 
undertakings as in the case of buyers of industrial machinery or an input for 
further processing or final consumers as for instance in the case of buyers of 
impulse ice-cream or bicycles.”56  
The same interpretation is maintained in the 2011 Guidelines on horizontal 
cooperation agreements57 and in the 2004 Merger Control Regulation and Guidelines.58 
The formulation of consumer welfare in law and in soft law therefore rules out an end-
user interpretation. The benefits accruing to the companies along the supply chain are to 
be counted just as much as the benefits accruing to the final users of the product. 
This conclusion is borne out not only by a textual analysis but also by the approach 
taken by the Commission in its practice. Certainly in merger decisions, end-user welfare 
is put in question when we consider the Commission’s assessment methodology. As 
part of the process of gathering data to inform a merger decision, the Commission 
conducts market investigations by means of surveying the competitors and the 
customers of the merging companies (e.g. the direct buyers of the company’s products). 
The harm estimated is the harm to these intermediary companies, not necessarily the 
harm to final consumers. 
In order to stay true to an end-user analysis, the Commission would have to ask parties 
to show the likelihood that the merger benefits (or harms) “trickle down” to the final 
consumers and do not get “absorbed” by the companies down the supply chain. This 
would be a complicated task for parties as it would require the consideration of the 
market structure and dynamics on the next market – the one in which the customers 
act as sellers toward the final consumers. For smaller, less wealthy claimants, 
establishing the likelihood of downstream consumer harm might be prohibitively 
expensive. Similar problems would arise for national competition authorities with 
limited budgets. Yet this would be the only way to honor a consumer welfare standard 
which puts the final consumers at the heart of analysis. 
2.3. Consumer surplus or a broader notion of welfare? 
The Commission has given reason to think that it prefers a narrow consumer surplus 
standard. Although it has stated that consumer welfare includes not just price, but also 
                                                                                                                                         
56  Commission (EU), Notice: Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97, 
[84].  
57  Commission (EU), Guidelines on the applicability of article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1, [49]. 
58  Article 2 (1) b of the Council Regulation (EU) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ L 24/1. Also mentioned in the accompanying Merger Guidelines: “Pursuant to 
Article 2(1)(b), the concept of ‘consumers’ encompasses intermediate and ultimate consumers, i.e. users of 
the products covered by the merger. In other words, consumers within the meaning of this provision 
include the customers, potential and/or actual, of the parties to the merger.” See Guidelines on the 
assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/5, endnote 105. 
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considerations such as quality, choice, and innovation, on several occasions the 
Commission has chosen to use price effects as “shorthand” for all these parameters.59   
Recent statements from the Commission suggest that the emphasis on prices and 
output in the 2004 Notice and in the 2009 Guidance paper might be short-lived. 
Recently, we see fewer statements from the Commission claiming that consumer 
welfare is the (ultimate) goal of (EU) competition law. More and more, the Commission 
seems to prefer formulating consumer welfare in terms of price, quality, and choice. 
The change in language can be observed in several of the more recent guidelines and 
notices issued by the Commission. For instance, the 2010 Block Exemption Regulation 
on Vertical Restraints60 and the guidelines61 accompanying it contain no specific 
reference to consumer welfare. Similarly, the 2011 Guidelines on the applicability of 
article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-
operation agreements62 mention consumer welfare explicitly only once, and this 
reference is inserted awkwardly in the specific case of standardization agreements.63  
Also, in the 2010 Regulation exempting R & D agreements from the application of Art 
101(1) TFEU,64 we do not find the statement that the objective of EU competition law 
is the promotion of consumer welfare. Instead, the Regulation does mention that R & 
D can bring benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices, improved products or 
services, or “quicker launch” of such products.65 However, this is by no means 
presented as the goal of competition law. 
What is the meaning of this change? It certainly does not mean that the consumer 
welfare standard has disappeared: however, it is seen more and more in its formulation 
as “price, quality and choice”. This makes a lot of sense given the Commission’s 
growing desire to promote competitiveness and encourage innovation. One might think 
                                                                                                                                         
59  See Commission (EU), Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7, [11] and 
Commission (EU), Notice: Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97, 
endnote 84. In the latter, the Commission states “In this Communication, the expression ‘increase prices’ 
includes the power to maintain prices above the competitive level and is used as short hand for the various ways in which the 
parameters of competition — such as prices, output, innovation, the variety or quality of goods or services — 
can be influenced to the advantage of the dominant undertaking and to the detriment of consumers.” (italics 
added). 
60  Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practice [2010] OJ L 
102/1. 
61  Commission (EU), Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/01. 
62  Commission (EU), Guidelines on the applicability of article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C 11/1.  
63  See Ibid., [269] where the Commission notes: “Intellectual property laws and competition laws share the 
same objectives of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.”(footnote omitted). 
64  Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development agreements [2010] 
OJ L 335/36. 
65  Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and development agreements [2010] 
OJ L 335/36, [10]. 
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that industrial policy considerations are displacing the more traditional allocative 
efficiency considerations. It is interesting to consider the statement in the Staff 
Working Paper accompanying the 2011 Report on Competition Policy:   
“EU competition policy aims at achieving three main objectives: i) protecting 
competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare, ii) 
supporting growth, jobs and the competitiveness of the EU economy and iii) 
fostering a competition culture.”66 
Curiously, consumer welfare is no longer the ultimate or primary goal, but rather one of 
the goals of EU competition policy and it appears on equal footing with industrial 
policy goals. Unsurprisingly, these other goals are aligned with EU’s 2020 agenda and 
focus on growth and competitiveness.67 This trend has continued. In a speech before 
the Global Competition Law Centre in Bruges in January 2014, former Competition 
Commissioner Joaquín Almunia barely mentioned impact on consumers and consumer 
benefits as goal of competition policy.68 Rather, he focused on underlining the 
importance of vigorous competition law enforcement for stimulating the EU’s global 
competitiveness, growth, investment and innovation.69 Given this change in language, it 
is no longer possible to accept that the Commission understands consumer welfare, or 
the goals of competition law for that matter, as a narrow consumer surplus standard. 
Rather, such statements prompt us to think that competition policy is not an 
independent legal discipline in the EU but a strategic tool, influenced by the broader 
objectives of the Union – and that it has a regulatory agenda. 
It is outside the scope of this paper to verify in what way the Commission’s decisions 
have supported growth and jobs. But there are some Commission’s decisions in cases 
involving IT markets which exemplify how the Commission’s concerns about choice 
and innovation can prevail over considerations about price. The tying claims in the 
Commission’s 2004 Microsoft decision70 expressed a concern with the disappearing from 
the market of other types of media players and thereby the limitation of choice and 
                                                                                                                                         
66  Commission (EU), ‘Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Report on Competition Policy 
2011’ SWD (2012) 141 final < http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2011/ 
part2_en.pdf > accessed 7 July 2015, 3. 
67  Commission (EU), ‘Report on Competition Policy 2011’ COM (2012) 253 final 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2011/part1_en.pdf> accessed 7 July 2015, 
9-10. The Commission notes: “[A] major part of the Commission's actions in the field of competition policy 
and enforcement in 2011 addressed the effects of the crisis in the financial markets. Nevertheless, 
competition enforcement and advocacy also serve other wider longer-term objectives such as enhancing consumer 
welfare, supporting the EU's growth, jobs and competitiveness in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth.” (italics added) 
68  Curiously, in one of the three times the former Commissioner used the word “consumer”, he clarified that 
consumers refers to both final consumers and intermediary purchasers. In his own words:  “Firms that set 
up cartels directly impose higher prices on their customers – whether they be final consumers or other 
companies along the value chain.” Joaquín Almunia, “Competition policy for the post-crisis world: A 
perspective” (Speech/14/34, 17 January 2014, Bruges, Belgium) < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release 
_SPEECH-14-34_en.htm > accessed 7 July 2015. 
69  Ibid. 
70  Commission Decision relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of the EC Treaty - Case COMP/C-3/37.792 
Microsoft C (2004)900 final. 
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innovation.71 But where was the (monetary) harm to consumers?72 Certainly, most 
consumers were happy to use Microsoft’s Media Player free of charge and were in any 
case free to download the additional media players they might have wanted. Although 
the Commission phrased the infringement in terms of “consumer harm”, we can read 
the Microsoft decision as one protecting the competitors’ possibility to sell an alternative 
product rather than as one protecting consumers from price hikes.  
Similarly, in the subsequent Commission decision against Microsoft, in 2009, which was 
related to the tying of Internet Explorer to Windows, the Commission once again 
considered the stifling effects of the practice on innovation and choice.73 Even though 
there was no monetary harm involved to users and despite the fact that many 
consumers were happy with Internet Explorer or were not concerned about its quality, 
the preservation of a variety of products on the market and the continued existence of 
possible innovators were considered important on their own.74 Similar concerns about 
preserving choice and innovation are visible in the Commission’s negotiation with 
Google.75 
Whether innovation considerations trump concerns about price in the Commission’s 
welfare calculus, we cannot tell with certainty. At the same time, it is rather unlikely that 
the opposite is true. What we do see is that end-user surplus is certainly not all that 
matters. Even in more traditional sectors, the Commission is concerned with choice 
                                                                                                                                         
71  Microsoft had raised the counter-argument that there was no harm in the tying of Media Player with 
Microsoft Windows precisely because the product was offered free of charge. The Commission stated: “It 
will be shown in the following section (recital (835) et seq.) that the harmful effects on consumers from 
tying WMP (also) derive from undermining the structure of competition in media players which is liable to 
result in deterrence of innovation and eventual reduction in choice of competing media players.” See Ibid., 
[832]. The Commission notes: “In particular, it will be shown that inasmuch as tying risks foreclosing 
competitors, it is immaterial that consumers are not forced to “purchase” or “use” WMP. As long as 
consumers “automatically” obtain WMP - even if for free - alternative suppliers are at a competitive 
disadvantage.” at [833]. 
72  It is perhaps worth noting that during the period of alleged abuse, some competing products actually cost 
money to download. For instance, Real Network’s 2004 RealPlayer10 had a basic version for free and 
premium version costing USD 19.95. Also, in the 1990s, none of Apple’s media players were for free. See 
Ibid., [125-140]. 
73  Commission Decision of 16.12.2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/C-3/39.530 – 
Microsoft (tying). The emphasis in the decision was on the foreclosure rather than on the consumer harm: 
“In particular, the Commission provisionally considered […] that the tying was liable to foreclose 
competition on the merits between web browsers. The Commission also took the preliminary view that the 
tying of Internet Explorer, in addition to reinforcing Microsoft's position on the market for client PC 
operating systems, created artificial incentives for web developers and software designers to optimise their 
products primarily for Internet Explorer” at [36-37]. 
74  Ibid. The Commission had a consultancy carry out a customer survey which concluded that most consumers 
suffered from an “information deficit” regarding Internet browsers, e.g. at [52]. The survey concluded that 
ost consumers using Internet Explorer either did not know how to or did not want to change browsers. 
75  In relation to the Google case, Joaquín Almunia, former Commissioner for Competition, has stated: “As 
you know, antitrust enforcement is about consumer welfare, innovation and choice, not about protecting 
competitors.” See Joaquín Almunia, “The Google antitrust case: what is at stake?” European Commission 
(Speech/13/768 delivered before the European Parliament, 1 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-768_en.htm> accessed 7 July 2015. 
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and innovation and considers them on at least equal footing as price effects.76 As the 
Commission enforcement ventures into industries where future investments, 
innovation and quality improvements are key, it is seems even less likely that we will see 
a narrow consumer surplus approach.  
PART 3: CONSUMER WELFARE AND THE COMMUNITY COURTS 
3.1. Consumer welfare before the Community Courts 
After the introduction of consumer welfare as a goal of EU competition law by the 
Commission, there was much anticipation as to whether the new vision would be 
endorsed by the Courts.  Consumer welfare enthusiasts found a source of optimism in 
two cases, Österreichische Postsparkasse77 and GlaxoSmithKline,78 in which the General 
Court inched in to endorsing something which could be interpreted to mean consumer 
welfare. The first such affirmation appeared in the 2006 decision of the General Court 
in Österreichische Postsparkasse.79 The case arose in reaction to a decision by the 
Commission’s Hearing Officer to grant access to the non-confidential versions of the 
statements of objections to an interested third party. The interested party in this case 
was an Austrian political party (FPÖ) and the statement of objections concerned a 
price-fixing cartel among banks in Austria. FPÖ’s requirement was arguably politically 
motivated – with the goal of discovering about certain individuals’ involvement in the 
conspiracy. The argument officially submitted by the FPÖ, however, was that as a 
consumer of banking services, it had a legitimate interest in the proceedings.80 The 
Commission accepted this argument. Upon appeal, the General Court concurred with 
the Commission in this regard and held: 
“It should be pointed out in this respect that the ultimate purpose of the rules that 
seek to ensure that competition is not distorted in the internal market is to increase 
the well-being of consumers. That purpose can be seen in particular from the wording 
of Article 81 EC. Whilst the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) EC may be 
declared inapplicable in the case of cartels which contribute to improving the 
production or distribution of the goods in question or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, that possibility, for which provision is made in Article 
                                                                                                                                         
76  In 2012, the Commission (DG COMP) issued a call for tender for the study of the impact of concentration 
on choice and innovation in the food sector. See Press Release, “Competition: Commission launches study 
on choice and innovation in food sector” (11 December 2012, Brussels, Belgium) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1356_en.htm> accessed 7 July 2015. The results of the study 
were made available in October 2014. See Press Release, “Competition: Commission publishes results of 
retail food study” (2 October 2014, Brussels, Belgium) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
1080_en.htm> accessed 7 July 2015. 
77  Österreichische Postsparkasse (n 8). 
78  Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR II-
02969. 
79  Österreichische Postsparkasse (n 8). 
80  The Commission argued that FPÖ as a consumer of the banking services affected by the cartel had a 
legitimate interest in submitting the application for access and that the purpose of the competition rules was 
the protection of consumers. See Ibid., [102-103]. 
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81(3) EC, is inter alia subject to the condition that a fair share of the resulting 
benefit is allowed for users of those products.”81  
We might be surprised about the term “well-being of consumers”, but the wording is 
mostly due to translation. Consumer welfare and “well-being of consumers” could be 
synonyms, although, as discussed above, “consumer welfare” is a technical term for the 
purposes of economics, while well-being is not. The French version of the decision 
speaks of bien-être du consommateur which is the French economic term for consumer 
welfare. This is also the term used in the French language versions of soft-law 
instruments such as the 2004 Notice on the application of the former Article 81(3),82 
and the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 
102.83 It is thus possible to conclude that the Court actually meant consumer welfare 
instead of a more general notion of well-being. Even if that is the case, however, the 
Court did not actually define the term, but instead linked its meaning to the wording of 
Article 101(3), thus implying that whatever consumer welfare might be, it is to be 
interpreted in light of this provision, which does not provide further guidance on the 
actual meaning of the term. 
This finding must be contrasted with the judgment in GlaxoSmithKline in 2006. In this 
case, the General Court was a lot more specific in explaining what it understood to be a 
restriction of consumer welfare. The case concerned GlaxoSmithKline’s action for 
annulment of a Commission decision claiming it had infringed Art 101 TFEU by 
limiting parallel trade. The General Court, referring to the decision in Österreichische 
Postsparkasse and to Consten and Grundig and Tepea v Commission,84 declared that the 
objective of Article 81(1) EC (currently Article 101(1) TFEU) was “to prevent 
undertakings, by restricting competition between themselves or with third parties, from 
reducing the welfare of the final consumer of the products in question.”85 Given this 
objective, the Court reasoned that a restriction of parallel trade cannot in and of itself 
mean that consumer welfare was decreased.86 In this case, the Court found that the 
                                                                                                                                         
81  The General Court stated: “It should be pointed out in this respect that the ultimate purpose of the rules 
that seek to ensure that competition is not distorted in the internal market is to increase the well-being of 
consumers.” Ibid., [115]. (emphasis added) 
82  Commission (EU), Notice: Lignes directrices concernant l'application de l'article 81, paragraphe 3, du 
traité  [2004] OJ C 101/97, [13, 21, 33, 104]. 
83  Commission (EU), Orientations sur les priorités retenues par la Commission pour l'application de l'article 82 
du traité CE aux pratiques d'éviction abusives des entreprises dominantes [2009] OJ C 45/7 [19, 30, 86]. 
84  Joined Cases 56 and 58-64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission 
of the European Economic Community [1966] English special edition Reports of Cases 1966-00299; Case 
28/77 Tepea BV v Commission of the European Communities [1978] ECR 01391. The reference to these 
cases is strange, because they are respectively from 1966 and 1978. As explained in the beginning of the 
chapter, consumer welfare was rather unknown as a concept at the time. To give a sense of perspective, 
Bork’s book was published in 1978 and the US Supreme Court endorsed consumer welfare in Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp (supra) in 1979.  
85  GlaxoSmithKline (n 78). 
86  Ibid., [119] and [147]. The Court stated: “Consequently, the application of Article 81(1) EC to the present 
case cannot depend solely on the fact that the agreement in question is intended to limit parallel trade in medicines or to 
partition the common market, which leads to the conclusion that it affects trade between Member States, but 
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Commission had not established that an obstruction of parallel trade would limit 
consumer welfare, in the sense of preventing consumers from obtaining lower prices.87 
In doing so, the General Court affirmed consumer welfare as the ultimate goal of the 
EU competition rules to the detriment of the internal market goal, which has been well 
established in its case-law. As to consumer welfare, the Court seemed to adopt a 
narrow end-user surplus standard – namely, the harm is a price decrease and the consumer 
here is the “final consumer of the products in question”.88 
This rather revolutionary interpretation, however, was struck down by the Court of 
Justice. With the GlaxoSmithKline decision of 6 October 2009,89 the ECJ rejected the 
need to prove consumer harm as a pre-condition to finding a restriction of competition 
by effect and affirmed that the goal of competition policy is protecting competition as 
such.90 Although the Court did not outright reject the value of consumer welfare, it 
significantly downplayed both its practical and normative value: 
“First of all, there is nothing in that provision to indicate that only those 
agreements which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an anti-
competitive object. Secondly, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held 
that, like other competition rules laid down in the Treaty, Article 81 EC aims to 
protect not only the interests of competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market 
and, in so doing, competition as such. Consequently, for a finding that an agreement has 
an anti-competitive object, it is not necessary that final consumers be deprived of the 
advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or price.”91  
The above quotation does not tell us how the Court understands consumer welfare, but 
it does give an indication of what would not be accepted by the Court: primacy of 
consumer welfare and consumer welfare in the sense of consumer surplus. The Court 
does not explicitly refer to consumer welfare and does not explain what “consumer 
interests” might mean precisely. Firstly, the Court speaks of “certain advantages” which 
very likely refers to the General Court’s requirement that price decreases be shown. The 
                                                                                                                                         
also requires an analysis designed to determine whether it has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition on the relevant market, to the detriment of the final consumer.” (emphasis added). 
87  The Court explained: “Consequently, the principal conclusion reached by the Commission, namely that 
Clause 4 of the General Sales Conditions must be considered to be prohibited by Article 81(1) EC in so far 
it has as its object the restriction of parallel trade, cannot be upheld. As the prices of the medicines concerned are to 
a large extent shielded from the free play of supply and demand owing to the applicable regulations and are set or controlled by 
the public authorities, it cannot be taken for granted at the outset that parallel trade tends to reduce those prices and thus to 
increase the welfare of final consumers. An analysis of the terms of Clause 4 of the General Sales Conditions, 
carried out in that context, therefore does not permit the presumption that that provision, which seeks to 
limit parallel trade, thus tends to diminish the welfare of final consumers. In this largely unprecedented 
situation, it cannot be inferred merely from a reading of the terms of that agreement, in its context, that the 
agreement is restrictive of competition, and it is therefore necessary to consider the effects of the agreement, 
if only to ascertain what the regulatory authority was able to apprehend on the basis of such a reading.” Ibid., 
[147] (emphasis added). 
88  Ibid., [118]. 
89  Joined cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission of the European Communities [2009] I-09291. 
90  Ibid., [63] 
91  Ibid., [63] (footnotes ommitted, emphasis added) 
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statement can thus be interpreted as a rejection of a narrow construction of consumer 
interest – namely, with respect only to price. As will be argued below, the Court has 
consistently placed value on other aspects of consumer well-being, including choice and 
innovation. Secondly, the Court held that the protection of consumer interests is not the 
only, nor the primary goal of EU competition law: the “other goals”, including the 
proverbial protection of competitors and “structure of the market” continued to play a 
role in defining which conduct is anti-competitive for the purposes of EU competition 
law.  
Courts are arguably careful with language and the inclusion of “not only” instead of an 
outright “no”, and the choice for the term “consumer interest” instead of “consumer 
welfare”, as well as the persistence of references to the importance of market structure 
and protection of competitors should not be seen as random nor as coincidental. Yet 
slippages do occur even in judgments by high courts and translation can alter the 
content of a text, so we need to seek further confirmation of this finding in the case 
law. Such a confirmation is available. Both before92 and after the GlaxoSmithKline 
decision, the Court of Justice has been consistent in holding that proving harm to 
consumers, consumer welfare or consumer interest is superfluous.93 Given this strong 
trend, the Court has maintained a traditional approach toward the goals of competition 
policy, thus raising questions about the validity or importance of consumer welfare as a 
goal. 
An opportunity to re-open the debate on whether the Court has accepted consumer 
welfare or not presented itself with the Post Danmark decision of 2012.94 This was the 
first time that the Court of Justice made a concrete reference to consumer welfare as 
such.95 It should be noted that the language of the Court of Justice was nowhere as 
firm as the statements of the General Court in Österreichische Postsparkasse and the 2006 
GlaxoSmithKline decision. Nonetheless, Post Danmark was quickly saluted as a case which 
deviates from the traditional line of the Court by aligning itself to the Commission’s 
Guidance Paper and by showing a warming up to the goal of consumer welfare.96 
Rousseva and Marquis find hopefulness for the Commission’s consumer welfare 
                                                                                                                                         
92  Case C-95/04 P British Airways plc v Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR I-02331; Case C-8/08 
T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-
04529; Case T-301/04 Clearstream Banking AG and Clearstream International SA v Commission of the European 
Communities [2009] ECR II-03155; Case C-105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op 
Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECR I-08725; Case C-209/07 Competition 
Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd. [2008] ECR I-08637; C-
125/07 P Erste Group Bank AG (C-125/07 P), Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG (C-133/07 P), Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt AG (C-135/07 P) and Österreichische Volksbanken AG (C-137/07 P) v Commission of the European 
Communities [2009] ECR I-08681. 
93  Case C-202/07 P France Télécom SA v Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECR I-02369; Case C-
280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v European Commission [2010] I-09555; Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v Telia 
Sonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-00527. 
94  Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] (electronic Reports of Cases). 
95  Ibid., [42]. See also Blair and Sokol (n 32), 2511. 
96  See Ekaterina Rousseva and Mel Marquis, “Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change for Assessing 
Exclusionary Conduct under Article 102 TFEU” (2012) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 
< http://jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/10/25/jeclap.lps059.full  > accessed 7 July 2015. 
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standard because of the Court’s use of references to consumer detriment and consumer 
interest in the judgment.97 The fact that the decision was delivered in Grand Chamber 
added weight to the belief that the Court was prepared to embrace change on the 
consumer welfare question. 
Still, the judgment does not give us a firm answer about the meaning of consumer 
welfare that the Court is prepared to accept, nor the standard of proof that this would 
imply.  The link between the Court’s allusions to “price, choice, quality or innovation” 
and the concept of consumer welfare is tenuous. Unlike the General Court’s 
interpretation of consumer welfare as end-user surplus in GlaxoSmithKline, the Court of 
Justice in Post Danmark did not make a connection between the notion of consumer 
welfare and these aspects of consumer interest, but simply stated that these are qualities 
of a company’s offer that are important to consumers.98 It should also be noted that 
the Court said “among other things” which implies that these are mere examples of 
what consumers might value, but not an exhaustive list.  Accepting that this is what 
competition law is about thus remains a plausible, though far from indubitable, 
interpretation. 
In the recent Intel decision,99 the General Court was faced again with arguments that 
the Commission needs to prove the anti-competitive effect of the allegedly unlawful 
practices. The General Court, in a decision, which quickly earned fame as yet another 
brush-off of the more economic approach,100 rejected these arguments. In particular, 
the Court found that it was not necessary for the Commission to show consumer harm:  
“[T]he Court would point out that, a fortiori, the Commission is not required to 
prove either direct damage to consumers or a causal link between such damage 
and the practices at issue in the contested decision. It is apparent from the case-
law that Article 82 EC is aimed not only at practices which may cause damage to 
consumers directly, but also at those which are detrimental to them through their 
impact on an effective competition structure.”101  
                                                                                                                                         
97  Ibid., 11. 
98  See Post Danmark (n 94) at [22]: “Competition on the merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from 
the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers 
from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation.” 
99  Case T-286/09 Intel Corporation v Commission [2014] ECLI:EU:T:2014:547. 
100  See for instance the post in the popular EU competition law blog “Chillin’ Competition”. Alfonso 
Lamadrid, “Breaking news- The Intel Judgment is out: the European Commission wins” (12 June 2014) 
<http://chillingcompetition.com/2014/06/12/breaking-news-the-intel-judgment-is-out-the-european-
commission-wins/ > accessed 7 July 2015 ; Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, “General Court Ruling in the Intel 
Appeal – Where Now for an Effects Based Approach to Rebates Under Article 102 TFEU?” (12 June 2014) 
Competition, Trade and Regulation E-Bulletin < http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/-
/media/Files/ebulletins/2014/20140612%20-%20General%20Court%20ruling%20in%20the%20Intel%20 
appeal%20%20where%20now%20for%20an%20effects%20based%20approach%20to%20rebates%20unde
r%20Article%20102%20TFEU.htm  > accessed 7 July 2015.  
101  Intel (n 99), [105] and referring to British Airways (n 92). See Intel (n 99), [308] where the Court states that the 
ability by Intel to provide “[p]roof of actual foreclosure, of AMD’s capacity constraints, of AMD’s 
marketing, of AMD’s technical performance or of harm to consumers” would not have been exculpatory 
since they are not required for establishing the unlawfulness of its conduct.  
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The Court further rejected the significance of consumer harm for determining the level 
of the fine.102 Intel claimed that in the period relevant for the decision there had in fact 
been vigorous competition between Intel and AMD, which had “resulted in constantly 
falling prices and improving product quality, to the benefit of consumers.”103 This 
argument, as well as the other arguments related to the importance of assessing the 
impact on consumers, were not accepted by the General Court.  
Does that mean the mention of consumer welfare in Post Danmark is already irrelevant? 
Perhaps not, although it does detract from whatever support that judgment gave to 
consumer welfare as a goal. It seems that given the body of case law from recent years 
rejecting the need for proving consumer harm, we may draw the preliminary conclusion 
that it is too early to celebrate consumer welfare’s victory.  
3.2. Harm to customers, consumers and producers 
In reaching conclusions about the Court’s thinking on consumer harm, we should 
consider not only that the Court has rejected the need for consumer harm, but also the 
fact that the Court has acknowledged that the harm experienced by producers or by 
business partners is just as important. This trend has not changed with the introduction 
of consumer welfare. Two prominent cases involving the exercise of buyer power, in 
which the harm is suffered upstream rather than downstream, prove this point: T-
Mobile104 and British Airways.105 The T-Mobile case106  essentially concerned exchange of 
information among buyers with a view to coordinating prices paid upstream: the Dutch 
telecom operators had collectively conspired to reduce the remuneration of dealers of 
postpaid subscriptions. In contrast to a cartel of sellers, the goal of the agreement was 
not to raise prices to final consumers, but rather to reduce costs. The harm would be 
experienced upstream – by the dealers whose remunerations would shrink.  
In its reference for a preliminary ruling, the national court posed the question if it was 
important that the practice did not relate to the prices for end users.107 On the 
                                                                                                                                         
102  Intel had claimed that the fine was of a disproportionate nature and that even though a finding of actual 
anticompetitive effects might not be required for the finding of abuse, then it should matter for the level of 
the fine Intel (n 99), [1621]. The Court disagreed and stated: “Second, in so far as the applicant submits that 
the Commission was wrong not to take into account the absence of actual anti-competitive effects of the 
infringement and of a causal link between those effects and harm to consumers or competitors as an 
attenuating factor for the assessment of the gravity, its arguments must also be rejected. The Court finds 
that, in order to set the proportion of the value of sales determined by reference to the gravity of the 
infringement at 5%, the Commission was not required to take into consideration the alleged absence of any 
actual impact of the infringement on the market. In the present case, the other matters on which the 
Commission relied in the contested decision for the purposes of determining the gravity of the infringement 
justify the setting of the proportion of the value of sales to be taken into consideration at 5%.” Intel (n 99), 
[1630]. 
103  Ibid., [1621]. 
104  T-Mobile (n 5). 
105  British Airways (n 92). 
106  T-Mobile (n 5). 
107  In the judgment we read: “The referring court states, first, that the concerted practice at issue in the main 
proceedings relates neither to the consumer prices to be applied by the undertakings in question nor to the 
subscription tariffs to be invoiced by those operators to the end users. What it actually relates to is the 
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understanding that the harm was not to be felt by final consumers, the referring court 
and the parties to the proceedings had submitted that the practice did not constitute a 
restriction by object.108 In her Opinion, AG Kokott rejected the relevance of showing 
harm to consumer welfare109 and the Court agreed with her.110 The Court took that 
decision despite evidence by the Dutch government that the remuneration to dealers 
did in fact matter for the final consumer prices.111 Essentially, the judgment did not 
discuss whether the reduction of the telecom operators’ costs as a result of the cartel was 
likely to benefit consumers in the form of lower prices, but held that the agreement 
restricted competition as such. 
Similarly, in the earlier British Airways judgment the Court of Justice refused the need to 
prove harm to final consumers in the context of a decision on Art 102 TFEU.112 Instead, 
the Court acknowledged that there had been harm to the providers of travel agent 
services. The case concerned the reward schemes offered by British Airways to travel 
agents. In addition to the exclusionary effect of the schemes vis-à-vis British Airways’ 
competitors, the practice was found to distort competition on the market for travel 
agent services. Because the reward schemes allowed travel agents to earn different 
commissions for equivalent services,113 the schemes were found to place some travel 
agents at a competitive disadvantage, thus falling within the scope of the prohibition of 
discrimination in Article 102(c) TFEU. The analysis of the Court in British Airways 
ended with a finding that since the ability of travel agents to compete with each other 
depend on their financial means, the competition on that market was liable to be 
distorted.114 No further proof of actual downstream effects in terms of a decrease in 
choice of travel agents or in terms of price competition among them was required.115 
Additionally, in British Airways, the Court specifically confirmed that Article 102 TFEU 
applies not only to downstream markets, but also to upstream markets and that the 
                                                                                                                                         
remuneration which those operators intend to pay for the services supplied to them by dealers. The point 
that is therefore emphasised by the referring court is that the direct object of the concerted practice cannot 
be said to be the determination of prices for postpaid subscriptions on the retail market.”  (italics added) T-
Mobile (n 5), [19]. 
108  See Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-04529, Opinion of AG Kokott, [55-56].  
109  Advocate General Kokott underplayed the relevance of consumer welfare “Thus, a concerted practice has 
an anti-competitive object not only where it is capable of having a direct impact on consumers and the prices 
payable by them, or – as T-Mobile puts it – on ‘consumer welfare’. Ibid., [59]. 
110  T-Mobile (n 5), [36].  
111  The Court held: “Third, as to whether a concerted practice may be regarded as having an anti-competitive 
object even though there is no direct connection between that practice and consumer prices, it is not 
possible on the basis of the wording of Article 81(1) EC to conclude that only concerted practices which 
have a direct effect on the prices paid by end users are prohibited.” Ibid., [37]. 
112  British Airways (n 92), [107]. 
113  The reward was based on the increase in an agents’ sales and not on the absolute number of tickets sold, 
thus making it possible that two agents selling the same number of British Airways tickets would receive 
different commissions. See paragraphs [130] and [135] in British Airways (n 92). 
114  Ibid., [146-148] 
115  Ibid., [149]. 
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provision applies to conduct by powerful sellers as much as to conduct by powerful 
buyers.116 
These rulings of the Court of Justice show that consumer harm, whether it is to the 
final or the intermediary purchaser, is not the only type of harm that matters in 
competition law cases. Harm to producers or sellers is also considered important for 
the purposes of EU competition law, regardless of the final effect on consumers. 
3.3. Consumer surplus v competition on the market 
The next question to address is whether the narrow price-based version of welfare – 
namely consumer surplus – could be considered the standard in the EU. With respect 
to the Court’s practice, we may safely say that the Court has not paid any specific 
attention to price effects. In fact, the Court has resisted the notion that concrete harm 
needs to be proven at all, instead insisting on the need to protect competition on the 
market or the “choice of suppliers”. This trend in the jurisprudence of the Court has 
put in question the relevance of the more economic approach proposed by the 
Commission and the statements about the importance of consumer welfare.  
In cases concerning Article 101 TFEU, the Court has continued to make use of the 
“restriction by object” category in and has rejected the need to show concrete harm in 
the context of agreements among competitors,117 much to the dismay of those 
expecting more effects-based analysis. Not only that, but the Court has even expanded 
the category of restrictions by object to encompass selective distribution schemes 
aiming to prevent online sales as in the Pierre Fabre case. 118 Similarly, in cases falling 
under Article 102 TFEU, the Court has rejected the need to prove any consumer 
harm119 and in general to prove actual harm to competitors and business partners in 
detail.120 
                                                                                                                                         
116  Ibid., [101], [143]. 
117  See Case C-105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission 
of the European Communities [2006] ECR I-08725, [125]; C-125/07 P Erste Group Bank AG (C-125/07 P), 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG (C-133/07 P), Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG (C-135/07 P) and 
Österreichische Volksbanken AG (C-137/07 P) v Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECR I-08681, 
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When it comes to the extent that consumer price effects matter vis-à-vis the other 
parameters of competition, perhaps most telling are the Court’s judgments in the 
margin squeeze and predatory pricing cases of recent years. The paradox of predatory 
pricing as well as margin squeeze cases is that, at least in the short run, consumers 
suffer no harm and might in fact enjoy various benefits, including low prices. In fact, 
according to the US Supreme Court, attempts at predation produce low prices and as 
such are a “boon to consumers”.121 
The danger in both margin squeeze and predatory pricing cases is that consumers will 
suffer in the long run – after competitors have exited and the development of 
competition has been thwarted. With weakened competition it is expected that prices 
will raise or quality might decline. From an enforcement perspective, the difficulty lies 
in determining when such practices are likely to lead to harmful effects or when they 
are the “stuff” of competition, namely, ambitious plans to win over new customers.122 
Deterring such conduct carries the risk that the welfare of present day consumers will 
be hurt on grounds of possible future welfare decreases, namely false positives in such 
cases are liable to bring imminent consumer harm in terms of higher prices.  
For instance, in the Wanadoo case consumers very likely enjoyed the advantageous 
prices offered by the dominant company. Their welfare, as measured in terms of short-
run consumer surplus, increased. However, the Court did not engage in an explicit 
balancing exercise to determine whether the increase in surplus was likely to be offset 
by likely future losses of welfare. The Court’s analysis in Wanadoo focused exclusively 
on the danger of competitors exiting the market, thus assuming that future welfare 
would be harmed. Possibility of recoupment is essentially the way to measure future 
consumer harm in terms of higher prices. The Court did not require proof of likelihood 
of future welfare losses because it rejected the necessity to prove the likelihood of 
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recoupment and in fact stated that even if there was no possibility of recoupment, this 
would still not matter for the finding of abuse.123 
Margin squeeze cases presents us with the same difficulty – namely, that in the short 
run there might be a benefit, or in any case, no harm in terms of prices to final 
consumers. The harm is expected to materialize in the future, once competitors have 
exited the market. In Deutsche Telekom, the Court did not consider the need for 
consumer harm. In fact, the Court avoided Deutsche Telekom’s arguments that 
avoiding a margin squeeze would have forced it to charge excessive prices to 
consumers.124 Essentially this meant that the Court was prompted to consider the 
tradeoffs between possible present-day harmful effects on consumer prices and the 
likelihood of loss of competition. The Court missed the opportunity to elaborate on 
this distinction. In general, it required no proof of effect beyond the existence of the 
squeeze as determined by reference to the company’s own costs.125 In Telia Sonera, the 
Court found that the mere potential for an exclusionary effect sufficed for the finding 
of abuse.126 
The judgment in Post Danmark promised a willingness on the part of the Court to pay 
more attention to the likely impact of dominant company conduct as measured in terms 
of consumer welfare. In its ruling, the Court of Justice held that a finding of abuse 
would require considering whether the pricing practice “produces an actual or likely 
exclusionary effect”.127 This is quite different from finding an abuse by presumption of 
harm and thus showed a breaking of the ice in the Court’s approach to effects-based 
analysis and consumer welfare. However, what the judgment actually means for the 
tradeoff between future welfare and present-day welfare or the tradeoff of welfare in 
terms of choice and innovation and welfare in terms of surplus – we still do not know. 
This is the biggest problem with Post Danmark – namely, that by introducing references 
to consumer welfare and suggesting a change of approach to a more rigorous analysis 
of effects, it raises more questions than it answers. Yet again, we are left wondering 
what “consumer welfare” means to the Court of Justice and how the different 
parameters (spatial, temporal) of “welfare” are to be counted.   
The debate about the goals and the methodology of EU competition law has continued 
with much vigor beyond Post Danmark. The Intel judgment of the General Court in 
2014 prompted numerous speculations about the fate of the more economic approach. 
The ruling in this case, concerning an infringement punished with the highest antitrust 
fine ever given in the EU, was considered a blow to the “more economic approach”. 
The recently published opinion of AG Kokott in Post Danmark II continues this 
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trend.128 If this trend continues, we might wonder if it is not futile to define the 
meaning of consumer welfare at all.   
Yet such a conclusion does not obviate the need for clarity. References to consumer 
welfare and standards of assessment premised on an understanding of consumer 
welfare as the ultimate goal continue to proliferate in the soft law instruments giving 
flesh to antitrust enforcement and providing indications for self-assessment. Thus, even 
if consumer welfare is indeed demoted to a second-rank goal of EU competition law, it 
still matters to define what it means. On the other hand, if the Court’s decision to 
support a consumer welfare standard is firm, then the Court needs to explain how a 
consumer welfare standard is to be understood. Without such guidance, academic 
debate will surely thrive, but legal certainty and consistency of enforcement will suffer.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The goal of this article was to find out more about the substance of the EU consumer 
welfare standard by focusing on the meaning of welfare and the meaning of a 
consumer. The method was one of comparing the definitions of the Commission and 
the Courts with the economic notion of end-user surplus. The analysis shows that it is 
not possible, on the basis of the definitions in EU competition law soft law instruments 
and the applications of the European Courts, to conclude the EU notion of consumer 
welfare coincides with an end-user surplus standard. 
This is, of course, only a partial answer to the larger question: what is EU competition 
law about? Uncertainty about the meaning of a consumer welfare standard continues to 
block our thinking on the fundamental issues in antitrust. Whose welfare counts most 
and what kind of tradeoffs can we make as between consumers, producers, and within 
consumer groups? What kind of welfare are we most interested in promoting? As the 
first section to this paper shows, the answers to these questions cannot be deduced 
from economic theory. The change of language in Post Danmark is only the beginning 
of the answer, not the ending of the conversation. 
This paper has attempted to show that the meaning of consumer welfare is not self-
explanatory and that the legal and economic literature can offer contradictory 
definitions. As the references for preliminary ruling in Syfait,129 Sot Lelos Kai130 and T-
Mobile show, we cannot assume that national courts know what the Commission means 
by “consumer welfare”. In this sense, the introduction of consumer welfare as a 
standard of assessment in EU competition law has compromised its objective of 
bringing uniformity of assessment across the EU. To preserve this important and 
fragile goal, the Commission and Courts need to face the problem and answer the basic 
questions relevant for any (competition law) case: what is harm, who can claim harm 
and what is the standard of proof? Such and other questions occupy national courts 
and authorities every day. Under the system of self-assessment introduced by the 
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modernization, these questions are also of vital interest to businessmen and their 
lawyers. Last, but certainly not least, these questions are also of interest to the larger 
public, in the name of whose welfare the trade-offs are being made. 
 
